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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Pursuant to the Joint Notification and Compromis concluded on 30
September 2008, including the Corrections and Clarifications agreed to
therein, at Chicago, Illinois, United States of America between the Republic
of Alicanto and the Commonwealth of Ravisia (collectively "the Parties"),
and in accordance with Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, the Parties hereby submit to this Court its dispute
concerning Operation Provide Shelter and the differences arising between
Alicanto and Ravisia
In accordance with Article 2 of the Compromis, the Court is hereby
requested to adjudge the dispute in accordance with the rules and principles
of international law, including any applicable treaties.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Republic of Alicanto ("Alicanto") gained independence from the
Commonwealth of Ravisia ("Ravisia") in 1958. It subsequently joined the
Ravisian Family of Allied Nations ("R-FAN"), a political and cultural
association of former Ravisian colonies. Bilaterally, Alicanto and Ravisia
have retained strong economic ties.
The Alicantan population comprises two major groups, the Zavaabi
and the Dasu. Both espouse the Talonnic faith. However, an orthodox
reading of the Talonnic holy book, which is restrictive of women's rights
and requires the death penalty, is embraced more widely by the Zavaabi and
the Guardians of the Talonnic Way ("the Guardians"), a political group
which has attracted a substantial increase in support since the early 1990s.
The Dasu minority, however, has traditionally dominated Alicantan
political and economic life.
Alicanto shares its eastern border, mostly on the Rocian Plateau, with
New Bennu, another former Ravisian colony. Its rough terrain makes
effective border control extremely difficult and, in March 2005, lawlessness
in the region, including arms and drug trafficking, prompted New Bennu to
undertake military enforcement action. This was violently retaliated by
armed groups and resulted in numerous Zavaabi deaths and aggravated
Dasu-Zavaabi tensions on both sides of the border.
In August, Alicanto's Dasu-led government was forced to resign
office. Subsequent emergency elections returned a Guardian-led
government under Prime Minister Simurg, who negotiated a cease-fire
agreement with New Bennu and requested enforcement action by the
United Nations. On 8 December, the Security Council adopted Resolution
5440, creating the United Nations Mission Overseeing the Rocian Plateau
and Hinterlands ("UNMORPH"), which began operations on 1 February
2006. The Resolution inter alia authorised certain radio transmissions.
Ravisia was UNMORPH's biggest contributor and Ravisian Major-General
Skylark was appointed to head the mission, which was based at Camp Tara.
Following allegations of sexual exploitation by UNMORPH soldiers in
October 2007, a Commission of Inquiry concluded that Ravisian troops had
routinely engaged in non-violent sexual relations with Alicantan girls, while
off-duty. It found that the girls, whose average age was sixteen, had
engaged in sexual acts out of hunger, fear, poverty, or all three, in return for
money or food. Alicantan law prohibits sexual relations with persons aged
under sixteen, but does not criminalise prostitution. No Ravisian service
members have been charged with sex-related crimes.
On 18 February 2008, Major-General Skylark reported that the
Alicanto-New Bennu border was now essentially peaceful. The following
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day, the Security Council adopted Resolution 6590 calling for the gradual
drawdown and eventual termination of UNMORPH by 31 July 2008. By
the end of March, half of UNMORPH troops had been removed with only
Ravisian personnel remaining. Also in March, the government of the
Northeast Province adopted an ordinance, based on Talonnic law, requiring
approval prior to the transmission of any secular broadcast.
Also in March, the Dasu Broadcasting Company was shut down for
failing to comply. UNMORPH broadcasts, whose content was
acknowledged as inconsistent with orthodox Talonnic teachings, continued
without prior approval. Tensions between the Dasu and Zavaabi throughout
the Northeast Province immediately flared and on 15 April, 35 Dasu
protesters were killed by armed police in riots in Melatha. These were
described by the Alicantan authorities as out-of-control New Year's Eve
celebrations. On 28 April, Prime Minister Simurg announced in his New
Year's message that Alicanto would adopt firm measures to combat
lawlessness and announced an overhaul of the judicial code to reflect the
Talonnic orthodoxy. He declared that Alicanto would brook no compromise
in its implementation. Pamphlets containing excerpts from this statement
were circulated throughout Alicanto.
According to a medical NGO, Doctors of the World ("DOW"),
sporadic riots and violence caused hundreds of deaths throughout Alicanto
over the next four weeks. On 1 June, martial law was declared in twelve
cities in the Northern provinces and by 30 June, the Dasu population of the
Northeast Province had been reduced by 30 per cent because of Dasus
fleeing toward New Bennu. DOW predicted ethnic cleansing on a massive
scale and warned that the lives of fleeing Dasus would be at risk if
humanitarian aid was not put in place immediately. On 3 July, Security
Council Resolution 6620 urged Alicanto to take immediate steps to improve
the humanitarian situation in the Rocian Plateau.
On 7 July, Prime Minister Simurg was killed in an explosion as his car
entered airport grounds. Alicantan police began a nationwide manhunt for
Piccardo Donati, the head of the Dasu Integrity Front, based on evidence
linking the bomb to that organisation. Self-proclaimed Zavaabi "defense
cadres" subsequently claimed responsibility for burning six Dasu villages in
the Plateau. Earth Without Frontiers, another NGO, reported that thousands
had been killed and that tens of thousands of Dasus from all parts of
Alicanto had fled the country.
On 22 July, the Ravisian President requested an emergency Security
Council session. Claiming possession of highly classified and extremely
reliable evidence, she stated that there was the imminent danger of ethnic
cleansing on a massive scale in Alicanto. Raw intelligence data was
provided to the Secretary-General who gave assurances not to disclose it,
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but did state in a report to the Security Council that it appeared to be
reliable. At the emergency session, both of Ravisia's proposed resolutions,
one extending UNMORPH's mandate and the other authorising collective
action by Ravisia and the other R-FAN members to restore order and
protect Alicantan citizens were defeated by the exercise of two vetos. In this
debate, Alicanto's demand for the Ravisian intelligence was ruled out of
order by the Security Council President. The next day, the SecretaryGeneral refused to disclose the intelligence to Alicanto, citing his
assurances to Ravisia and stating that he would not reconsider this position
unless the International Court of Justice declared this legally permissible.
R-FAN members subsequently endorsed Ravisia's unilateral intervention in
Alicanto and agreed to admit Dasu refugees.
On 31 July, the Secretary-General announced the termination of
UNMORPH. The next morning, Ravisia declared the beginning of
Operation Provide Shelter ("OPS") and transferred troops into Camp Tara.
Major-General Skylark remained in command. Alicanto's new Prime
Minister denounced this as an act of war.
On 15 August, the Alicantan Parliament adopted a new Judicial Code
reintroducing the death penalty and limiting the right of women to hold real
property or businesses. Subsequent skirmishes in the Northeast Province
were extinguished by Ravisia without the support or interference of the
Alicantan police. On 28 August, 25 people were reportedly killed by
Alicantan police at a demonstration by local women's rights organisations.
On 21 August, after an unsuccessful nationwide manhunt, Piccardo
Donati was tried in absentia, represented by a distinguished Public
Defender. Apart from noted concerns about Donati's absence, human rights
NGOs described the trial as consistent with international norms. On 1
September, a panel of three judges declared Donati guilty of eleven counts
of murder and sentenced him to death by hanging. If carried out within 12
years, this sentence can be applied without retrial. An appeal brought on his
behalf was rejected in a published opinion. On 17 September, MajorGeneral Skylark confirmed reports that Donati was staying at Camp Tara
and announced that she would not hand him over to Alicanto for judicial
execution.
On 30 September, the parties submitted their dispute to this Court for
adjudication.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Republic of Alicanto respectfully asks the Honourable Court:
Whether the occupation of Alicantan territory by Ravisian armed
forces since 1 August 2008 violates international law, and whether Ravisia
must remove its military personnel from Alicanto at once;
Whether Ravisia is obliged to produce its classified intelligence, and
whether, if it refuses, Ravisia can rely on that intelligence before this Court,
or in the alternative whether the Secretary- General may lawfully hand over
the intelligence to Alicanto;
Whether the conduct of Ravisian soldiers at Camp Tara, including the
broadcasting of offensive radio programming and the sexual exploitation of
Alicantan children, are violations of international law and of the
sovereignty and cultural and religious integrity of Alicanto, attributable to
Ravisia, and whether Ravisia must pay reparations to compensate for the
injury to Alicanto's social fabric; and
Whether the Alicantan citizen Picardo Donati must be handed over to
Alicanto, where he will be subject to judicial execution, and whether the
execution is a violation of international law.
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

Ravisia's military intervention in Alicanto under OPS violated its
territorial integrity and thus the peremptory general prohibition on the use
of force. This violation cannot be legally justified under either the right of
self-defence or the express authority of the Security Council. Moreover,
Ravisia cannot justify its invasion of Alicanto by reference to a right of
humanitarian intervention. While such a right has on occasion been
asserted, such claims do not reflect customary law due to the extent to
which they have been contested by the majority of the international
community. In the alternative, even if such a customary right has emerged,
its criteria are not satisfied, as no peremptory human rights violations have
been perpetrated in Alicanto and the intervention was neither a last resort
nor a collective action. The burden of proof is on Ravisia to prove the
existence of the asserted human rights violations conclusively. Ravisia's
intervention therefore was and continues to violate international law. The
Court should therefore order Ravisia to cease its wrongful conduct and
leave Alicanto immediately.
It follows from the fundamental principle of procedural equality that
the Court has the power to request relevant documents from the parties. The
parties are also under a duty to cooperate with the Court in the
establishment of the facts. The fact that Ravisia's classified intelligence is
fundamental to its claims rebuts any presumption as to the legality of its
conduct. Additionally, the Secretary-General's report to the Security
Council should be given no weight as it amounts to hearsay. The Court
should therefore request the production of the classified intelligence, and if
Ravisia refuses to comply, should deny it the right to rely on it to justify its
intervention. The Court, moreover, should draw an adverse inference from
any non-disclosure by Ravisia to the effect that its intelligence actually
undermines its position. Alternatively, the Court should declare that the
Secretary-General may lawfully hand over Ravisia's intelligence to
Alicanto. This does not conflict with the Court's role as a UN principal
organ. Ravisia, through its disclosure of the intelligence to the SecretaryGeneral, is precluded from subsequently insisting on total control over it.
The Secretary-General's duty of loyalty to the UN militates further in
favour of this proposition.
The sexual abuses perpetrated by Ravisia's soldiers during
UNMORPH amount to rape as the girls only consented out of fear arising
from the presence of the soldiers. These offences are attributable to Ravisia,
as they occurred within its effective control, and are therefore violations of
Ravisia's obligations under the SOFA and international law to respect
Alicantan laws and regulations, to prevent and punish the exploitative use
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of children in prostitution and to protect Alicantan women from acts of
rape. As Resolution 5440 must be interpreted compatibly with the SOFA,
Ravisia cannot, through its State organs, transmit offensive radio broadcasts
without prior approval. In any event, Ravisia's continuation of these
broadcasts during OPS necessarily violates Alicanto's sovereignty as
UNMORPH's mandate has expired. In addition, countermeasures cannot
preclude the wrongfulness of the broadcasts as Alicanto is not in breach of
any relevant obligations and, in any event, the requisite conditions are not
satisfied. Alicanto therefore requests reparations for Ravisia's wrongful
conduct.
Ravisia's failure to surrender Piccardo Donati violates Alicanto's
sovereign right to exercise enforcement jurisdiction over its territory.
Ravisia is also in breach of Resolution 1373 and customary law for
providing a terrorist fugitive with a safe haven. Ravisia cannot invoke its
obligations under the ICCPR to claim necessity as a circumstance
precluding wrongfulness. The ICCPR would not be violated by
surrendering Donati as the death sentence was imposed in accordance with
Alicantan and international law for an exceptionally serious crime. The
reintroduction of the death penalty does not render Donati's sentence
unlawful as this was reasonably foreseeable and accessible from Prime
Minister Simurg's declared intention to reform the Judicial Code to reflect
Talonnic law. Donati has waived his right to be tried in his presence and has
also exhausted his right to review. Since he will be executed by hanging
once returned, he will not be exposed to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment that would violate his rights. Ravisia must therefore cease this
wrongful act by returning Donati.
PLEADINGS

I. THE COMMONWEALTH OF RAvISI's ("RAvISIA") INTERVENTION IN
THE REPUBLIC OF ALICANTO ("ALICANTO") CONSTITUTES A CONTINUING
VIOLATION OF ALICANTO'S SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Notwithstanding its increasing recognition of human rights norms, the
sovereign equality of States remains the basic principle of international
law.' The rule requiring a State's consent? in respect of any incursion onto
its territory is therefore fundamental in international law.

I.
United Nations Charter [1945] 1 UNTS XVI, Art.2(l); Brownlie, 'Principles of Public
InternationalLaw' [6th ed. Clarendon Press, Oxford 2003], p.287.
2.

UNGA Res 2625 [1970] UN Doc A/8082, p.121.
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A. Ravisia Has Violated Alicanto's Sovereignty.
As the incursion of Ravisian military troops into Alicanto on 31 July
2008 under Operation Provide Shelter ("OPS") occurred without latter's
consent, Ravisia has violated Alicanto's sovereignty, which is protected by
the United Nations Charter ("the Charter") and customary law.
1. OPS constitutes a use of force.
Article 2(4) of the Charter requires States to refrain "from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."3 This rule is elaborated by Principle 3 of the 1970 Declaration on
Principles of International Law, which prohibits States from intervening,
"directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other State." 4 The rule in Article 2(4) is also recognised as
customary law5 and ajus cogens norm.6 Its interpretation has not materially
changed.
Territorial integrity denotes the inviolability of a State's physical
territory and the proscription of forcible trespassing of any kind7 and is
infringed by the mere landing of military troops of one State on the territory
of another.8 Ravisia's invasion of Alicanto therefore violated Alicanto's
territorial integrity.
2. Ravisia's use of force was unlawful.
Exceptionally, the Charter provides for the right of States to use force
either in self-defence 9 or upon the Security Council's exercise of its Chapter

3.

UN Charter, Art.2(4).

4.
UNGA Res 2131 [1965] UN Doc A/6014. See also Militaryand ParamilitaryActivities in
and against Nicaragua(Nicaraguav United States of America) (Merits) [ 1986] ICJ Rep 14 [Nicaragua
case], pp. 107 - 8 .
5.
Nicaragua case ibid., para.190; Randelzhofer, 'Article 2' in Simma (ed.), 'The Charterof
the UnitedNations, A Commentary' (Volume I) [2nd ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002], p. 1 12.
6.
Nicaraguacase, para.190; UNGA GAOR Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 'Report of
the International Law Commission' 18th Session [ 1966] II ILC Ybk, pp.247-9 & 261.
7.
McDougal and Feliciano, 'The International Law of War' [1st ed. Martinus Nijhoff,
Dordrecht 1994], p. 17 7 . See also Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4
[Corfu Channel case], p.34.
8.
Randelzhofer, supra note 5, p.123; Jessup, 'A Modern Law of Nations' [Ist ed. The
Macmillan Company, New York 1948], pp. 1 6 9- 7 0 .
9.

UN Charter, Art.51.
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VII powers.' However, neither exception can be successfully invoked by
Ravisia.
a. OPS is not a valid exercise of the right to self-defence.
The inherent right of individual or collective self-defence can only be
exercised in response to an actual or threatened armed attack against
another State." Since no such attack has been suffered by Ravisia, or
indeed any other State, the right to self-defence cannot be claimed in the
present circumstances. 12
b. OPS did not receive Security Councilauthorisation.
i. The language of Resolution 6620 betrays Ravisia's claim.
Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council has the sole
authority to determine when a threat to, or breach of, the peace has
occurred 13 and thus to authorise the use of force.' 4 The wording of its
resolutions are determinative of their content. The Security Council must
therefore clearly specify the extent, nature and objective of any sanctioned
military action. Absent such clarity, any subsequent use of force will be
unlawful.' 5 Therefore, there can be no doctrine of implied authority of
Security Council resolutions cannot therefore be allowed for as it
necessarily entails the distortion of words.' 6 The wording of Security
Council Resolution 662017 ("Resolution 6620"), however, is substantially
weaker than the "all necessary means" formulation traditionally used by the

10.

UN Charter, Arts.43-48.

11.

Supra note 9.

12.

Nicaraguacase, p.105.

13.

UN Charter, Art.39.

14.
UN Charter, Art.24; Cassese, 'InternationalLaw in a Divided World' [1st ed. Clarendon
Press, Oxford 1988], p.215.
15.
De Wet, 'The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council' [ 1st ed. Hart
Publishing, Oxford 2004], p.268-9; Legal Consequencesfor States of the ContinuedPresence of South
African Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Advisory
Opinion) [1971] 1CJ Rep 16, p. 3 5 .
16. Gray, 'InternationalLaw and the Use of Force' [2nd ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford
2000], pp. 191-5. See also Lobel & Ratner, 'Bypassingthe Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations
to Use Force, Cease-Firesand the IraqiInspection Regime'[1999] 93 AJIL 125, pp.130-4 & 152-3.
17.

UNSC, [2008] UN Doc S/RES/6620.
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Security Council in resolutions authorising the use of force.' 8 The Security
Council's expression of its readiness to consider further measures also
indicates that it expected to make further determinations.
ii. Resolution 5440 is not revivable.
In any event, even if the implied authority of Security Council
resolutions is allowed for, Security Council Resolution 5440 ("Resolution
5440") is not revivable as it was directed solely at UNMORPH and has
been lawfully terminated by Security Council Resolution 6590.'9
B. Ravisia'sActions Cannot Be Justified Under A Right Of Humanitarian
Intervention.
It is submitted that, under the established rules concerning the
formation of rules of customary law, a right of unilateral humanitarian
intervention is not presently recognised in international law. Ravisia
therefore cannot justify its intervention on solely humanitarian concerns.
1. There is no recognised right of humanitarian intervention in
international law.
a. There is no establishedcustomary right ofpure humanitarian
intervention.
The modus operandi of customary law presupposes state equality and
a principle of majoritarianism. 20 This comprises State practice, an objective
requirement that encompasses any acts from which views about customary
law may be inferred, 2 ' which (cumulatively) must be settled, widespread
and consistent,22 and opinio juris, a subjective element that requires State
practice to be consciously accepted as law.2 3

18.

Quigley, 'The "Privatization" of Security Council Enforcement Action: A Threat to

Multilateralism' [1996] 17 MJIL 249, p. 262. C.f inter alia UNSC Res 5440 [2005] UN Doc

S/RES/5440.
19.

UNSC, [2008] UN Doc S/RES/6590.

20.
Brownlie, 'InternationalLaw at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations' [1995-1]
255 Recueil des Cours de l'Acadimie de Droit International 9, p.4 9 .
21.
Statute of the ICJ [1945] 1 UNTS 993 [ICJ Statute], Article 38(1)(b); Shaw, 'International
Law' [5th ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003], p.80.
22.

North Sea Continental Shelf (FederalRepublic of Germany v Denmark) (Merits) [1969]

ICJ Rep 3 [North Sea ContinentalShelf case], para.77.
23.
ICJ Statute, Article 38(1)(b); See also Oppenheim & Roxburgh, 'InternationalLaw: A
Treatise' [3rd ed. The Law Book Exchange, London 2005], p. 2 2 .
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It is submitted that the instances in which a right of unilateral
humanitarian intervention have been claimed over the last half century, in
particular, India's 1971 intervention in East Pakistan, Vietnam's 1978
intervention in Kampuchea and Tanzania's 1978 intervention in Uganda,
constitute insufficient State practice to amount to a new rule of customary
law as each was severely contested by the generality of the international
community.2 4 The absence of opinio juris is indicated by the fact that,
notwithstanding variously asserted humanitarian motives, in each case the
formal legal justification proffered was self-defence.2 5
b. No such right has evolved subsequent to the Kosovo intervention.
Alicanto submits that the 1999 military intervention in Kosovo by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") has not since created a
customary rule of pure humanitarian action. Firstly, it did not represent
sufficiently settled State practice as it was either condemned or its legality
repudiated by a clear majority of the international community. 26 Moreover,
the emphatic statements of several intervening States that they were not
creating precedent 27 and the fact that only three intervening States can be
construed to have claimed such a right 28 strongly point to the absence of
opinio juris. Similarly, the "responsibility to protect" as articulated by the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
("ICISS"), 29 despite its prima facie endorsement at the 2005 World
Summit, 30 met profound disagreement in the international community inter

alia over the question of whether the Security Council has the sole authority

24.

UNSC SCOR [4 December 1971] UN Dc S/10416; UNGA Res 2793 [1971] UN Doc

AiL.647/Rev.1;

25.

UNSC

SCOR [11 December 1978] UN Doc S/12962.

Ibid.

26.
Group
of
77,
'Declaration
of
the
South
Summit'
<http://www.g77.org/doc/DeclarationG77Summit.htm> accessed 6 January 2009.
27.

Deutscher

Bundestag,

Plenarprotokoll

13/248

[16

October

[2000]
1998]

<http://dip2l.bundestag.de/dip2l/btd/13/002/1300248.pdf> accessed 6 January 2009; US Secretary of

State Madeleine Aibright, 'Press Conference with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Singapore' [26
July 1999] < http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990726b.html> accessed 6 January 2009.
28.

Legality of Use of Force Case (Yugoslavia v Belgium) (ProvisionalMeasures) [10 May

1999] ICJ Pleadings (CR 99/15); UNSC SCOR [24 March 1999] UN Doc S/PV.3988, pp.8& 11.

29.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 'The Responsibility to

Protect' [lst ed. ICISS, Ottawa 2001], para.2.30.
30.
paras.1 38-9.

UNGA '2005 World Summit Outcome'

[20 September 2005] UN Doc A/60/L.1,

at
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to authorise the use of force. 3' As customary law cannot be formed in a
revisionist manner, a pure right of humanitarian intervention has not
emerged.3 2
2. Assuming that such right exists, its criteria are not satisfied.
If there is a right of humanitarian intervention in international law, its
requisite criteria would necessarily include (but not be limited to): the
existence or imminence of genocide or crimes against humanity, the
exhaustion of all peaceful means of resolving the situation and collective
action.

33

a. There has been neither a genocide nor crimes against humanity (actual
or imminent) in Alicanto.
Owing to the peremptory nature of the rule in Article 2(4) of the
Charter, a right of humanitarian intervention could only exist as a response
to human rights violations that were themselves peremptory. Genocide and
crimes against humanity are the two material, recognised peremptory
human rights norms in international law.34 These must be established
subsequent to 18 February 2008 when Major-General Skylark declared that
the pre-existing violence had ceased.
i. Ravisia must discharge a heavy burden of proof in this matter.
It is well-established in customary law that the party asserting a
particular fact bears the burden of proving it.35 Ravisia, as the party
asserting the existence of evidence justifying its intervention, therefore
31.
Government of China, 'PositionPaper of the People's Republic of China on the United
Nations Reforms' [7 June 2005] <www.china-un.org/eng/smhwj/2005/t199101.htm> accessed 6 January
2009, pp. 10-12; Rahman, 'Official Statement at the Informal Meeting of the Plenary of the General
2005]
June
[21
Document'
Outcome
Draft
the
Concerning
Assembly
<www.un.int/malaysia/NAM/nam2l06O5.html> accessed 6 January 2009.
32.

45 9
Gray, supra note 16, pp. - .

Stromseth, 'RethinkingHumanitarianIntervention: The Case for Incremental Change' in
33.
Holzgrefe & Keohane (eds.), 'HumanitarianIntervention: Ethical,Legal, and PoliticalDilemmas' [Ist
250
if.
ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003] p.
34.

Crawford,

'The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility:

Introduction, Text and Commentaries' [1st ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002], p.188;
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v Spain)
(Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, para.33-4.
35.

Nicaragua case, para. 101; Requestfor Interpretationof the Merits of 20 November 1950 in

28
the Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) [1950] ICJ Rep 266, p. 1; Rights of Nationals ofthe UnitedStates
19 1
.
ofAmerica in Morocco (Francev United States ofAmerica) [ 1952] ICJ Rep 176, p.
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bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof of such a party turns on the
seriousness of the alleged breaches.3 6 The Court has held that where the
offences alleged are of exceptional gravity, they must be proved by the
production of fully conclusive evidence. 37 While the above rule related to
State attributability, it is submitted that where a State undertakes a military
intervention, it must demonstrate
its asserted justifications by the same
38
conclusively.
standard
In addition, the Court has stated that, in its assessment of evidence, it
will treat materials emanating from a single source with caution and will
favour contemporaneous evidence from persons with direct knowledge. 39 It
is submitted that these rules of evidence are applicable to the present
circumstances.
ii. No crimes against humanity (actual or imminent) have been perpetrated
in Alicanto.
Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
provides that a crime against humanity is the multiple commission inter alia
of murder or the forcible transfer of population "as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge
of the attack. ' 4 ° The recent increase in criminality in Alicanto has, however,
been neither widespread nor systematic. Doctors of the World's ("DOW")
allegation of violent deaths in the Northeast Province and subsequent
prediction of the possibility of future ethnic cleansing in Alicanto are
unreliable as they are both substantially based on the evidence of a single
source, which has not been independently verified.

36.
Kolb, 'General Principles of ProceduralLaw' in Zimmermann & Ors. (ed.), 'The Statute
of the InternationalCourt of Justice: A Commentary' [1st ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006]
[Zimmermann], p.823, para.53. See also Mexico City Bombardment Claims (Great Britain v United
Mexican States) [1930] V RIAA 76, p. 80 .
37.
C.f Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) [2007] ICJ Rep I [Bosnian
Genocide case], para.209; Corfu Channel case, p.17.
38.
C.f.Nicaragua case, p.53; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v
Honduras:Nicaraguaintervening) (Intervention) [ 1990] ICJ Rep 92, paras. 117-8.
39. Nicaragua case, at para.64; Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (DemocraticRepublic ofthe Congo v Uganda) (Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep, para.61.
40.

[1998] 2187 UNTS 90.
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iii. There has been no genocide in Alicanto.
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide4 ' defines genocide as inter alia the killing of members of a
protected group or deliberately inflicting on a group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction, "with intent to destroy it
in whole or in part. ' 42 It is submitted that DOW's prediction of the
possibility of ethnic cleansing has nil value in this context as the specific
intent of genocide, as distinct from the mere expulsion of a group, 43 is
attributable neither to Alicanto through its enforcement action, 44 nor to any
non-state actor. The violence that has occurred in Alicanto, including the
deaths of 35 Dasu protesters in Melatha, were tragic but isolated incidents
and do not constitute a manifest pattern Dasu-targeted abuses.45
Additionally, it is contended that the relative inactivity of Ravisian troops
throughout the period of its intervention points to the success of the
Alicantan authorities in dealing with the disturbances in its Northern
Provinces.
b. Military action by Ravisiawas not a last resort.
Ravisia did not pursue any peaceful alternatives to military action in
Alicanto. These could have included targeted economic sanctions,
diplomatic sanctions and action to suspend or expel Alicanto from the
Ravisian Family of Allied Nations ("R-FAN"). It is submitted that the
extent of the political, educational and economic ties fostered by
membership of R-FAN point to the likely success of such measures.
c. Ravisia's intervention is not collective.
Ravisia's military action was and continues to be unilateral. 46 It
involves solely Ravisian troops operating under solely Ravisian command
structures. Indeed, despite their relative proximity to Alicanto, no member
of R-FAN has provided military, financial or even logistical support.47

41.

[1948] 78 UNTS 277.

42.

Ibid., Art.2.

43. Schabas, 'Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes' [1st ed. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 2000], pp. 189-201.
44. Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts UNGA Res 56/83, UN
GAOR 56th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 162, [2001] UN Doc A/RES/56/83 [ARSIWA], Arts.4&8.
45.

C.f Prosecutorv Radislav Krstik ICTY-98-33-T [2001], para.682.

46.

Supra note 33, p.2 5 1 .

47.

C.f Nicaraguacase, para. 115.
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C. Ravisia Must Cease Its InternationallyWrongful Act.
It follows Ravisia is therefore under an obligation in international law
to cease this wrongful act and leave Alicantan territory immediately.4
II. RAVISIA SHOULD BE CALLED UPON To PRODUCE ITS CLASSIFIED
INTELLIGENCE AND, IF IT REFUSES, SHOULD BE DENIED THE RIGHT To
RELY ON IT. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT SHOULD DECLARE THAT THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL MAY LAWFULLY HAND OVER THE INTELLIGENCE
TO ALICANTO.

A. The Court Should Call Upon Ravisia To Produce Its Classified
Intelligence.
1. The Court has a general power to request the production of evidence.
The Statute of the Court and the Rules of the Court authorise the Court
to call upon the parties to produce any such documents or explanations as it
considers necessary for the elucidation of any aspect of the matters in
issue. 49 This general power, which may be exercised at the parties'
request, 50 derives from the principle of the proper administration of justice
and operates to ensure that the Court has access to all relevant evidence
prior to reaching a decision.5'
2. Ravisia's failure to cooperate in the establishment of material facts
undermines the parties' procedural equality.
The equality of the State parties to a dispute is the basic principle of
proceedings before the Court.52 The Court is thus under a continuing duty to
ensure the equality of arms of litigating parties.53 In addition, the corollary
principle of cooperation, which also flows from the parties' duty of good
faith,54 requires State parties to cooperate with the Court in the

48.

ARSIWA, Art.30.

49.

ICJ Statute, Art.49; Rules of the ICJ, Art.62.

50.

Bosnian Genocide case, para.44.

51.
Rosenne, 'The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996'[Martinus
Nijhoff, The Hague 1997] [Rosenne], p.1080; Sandifer, 'Evidence before International Tribunals'

[University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville
Zimmermann, p. 1096, para.68.

1975] [Sandifer], pp. 1-2; Tones Bernr'dez, in

52.

Nicaragua case, para.31; Kolb, in Zimmermann, p.799, para.9.

53.

Kolb, in Zimmermann, p.800, paras.I 1-12.

54.

Kolb, in Zimmermann, p.83 1, para.65.
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establishment of the relevant facts55 inter alia by disclosing their best
evidence.56 These principles necessarily entail the parties' and the Court's
access to all relevant documents.57
Alicanto submits that, given the absence of probative open evidence
for the alleged peremptory human rights violations in Alicanto,58 the
withheld Intelligence Report, as the only other basis upon which its
intervention can be justified, is of fundamental importance to Ravisia's case
and puts Alicanto at a severe procedural disadvantage.
In addition, the fact that Ravisia claims that the Intelligence Report
contains material prejudicial to its national security does not detract from
the parties' duty to collaborate.5 9 On this basis, the Court has reasoned that
the non-disclosure of a classified document that is of primary significance
to the legality of the withholding
State's conduct will rebut any presumptio
60
juris as to its legality.
3. The Secretary-General has not engaged in adequate fact-finding.
The Court has accepted the fact-finding of other organisations where
the persons directly involved in the dispute have been tested by crossexamination and it is evidenced by extensive documentation. 6' However, in
the present case, the Secretary-General has not engaged in any fact-finding
of his own. By his own admission, he is unable to confirm the veracity of
the Intelligence Report's findings. The Secretary-General's Report can
therefore amount to no more than hearsay evidence and therefore cannot be
given any weight.62
It is therefore requested that the Court calls upon Ravisia to convey its
classified Intelligence Report to Alicanto with immediate effect.

55.
UNGA GAOR Model Draft Rules on ArbitralProcedure,'Report of the International Law
Commission' 10th Session [1958] II ILC Ybk, Art.21; Amerasinghe, 'Evidence in International
Litigation' [ 1st ed. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2005], p. 2 0 5 .
56.
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case (United Kingdom v Norway) (Judgment) [1951] ICJ Rep
116; Cheng, 'General Principles of Law as Applied by InternationalCourts and Tribunals' [1st ed.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006], p. 3 2 0 .
57.
HRC Paul Perterer v Austria Communication No. 1015/2001 [2004] UN Doc
CCPR/C/81/D/1015/2001, p.20; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 'Report on Terrorism
and Human Rights' [22 October 2002] OEA/Ser.LJV/11.116, Doc.5 rev. 1 cor., para.238.
58.

Memorial I(B)(2)(a); Cf Bosnian Genocidecase, para.206.

59.

Bosnian Genocide case, para.206.

60.
115, p. 12 9 .

Corfu Channel (UK v Albania) (Merits) Judge Ecer, Dissenting Opinion [1949] ICJ Rep

61.

Bosnian Genocide case, para.214.

62.

Corfu Channel case, p.369.
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B. Ravisia,If It Refuses To Produce Its Intelligence, Should Be Denied
Right To Rely On It To Support Legality OfIts Intervention.
1. Ravisia, if it refuses to comply, should not be allowed to rely on the
classified intelligence.
The ICJ Statute authorises the Court to take "formal note" of any
refusal to comply with a request for evidence.63 Moreover, pursuant to
Article 56(4) of the Rules, no reference may be made during the oral
proceedings to the contents of any document which has not been produced,
unless the document is part of a publication that is readily available. It is
therefore submitted that if Ravisia fails to provide Alicanto and the Court
with copies of the full text of the Intelligence Report it should not be
allowed to rely on it.
2. The Court should draw an adverse inference from Ravisia's refusal
to comply.
Where a party withholds essential evidence in its possession or control,
the Court may assume that the evidence withheld would expose
circumstances unfavourable to its position. 64 It is submitted that as the
Intelligence Report is central to Ravisia's claims, which are not buttressed
by the open evidence, Ravisia's non-disclosure naturally yields itself
conclusions detrimental to Ravisia.65 It is therefore requested that the Court
draws an adverse inference from Ravisia's concealment of its primary
intelligence data to the effect that it actually undermines its case.
C. In The Alternative, The Court Should Declare That The SecretaryGeneralMay Lawfully Hand Over The Intelligence To Alicanto.
1. The Court is competent to make the requested declaration.
a. The requesteddeclarationforms part of the legal dispute between
the Parties.
The Court's contentious jurisdiction, which the Parties have accepted
by special agreement pursuant to Article 40(1) of the ICJ Statute, enables it,
by virtue of Article 94(1) of the Charter, to make binding determinations by
adjudication on legal disputes between States.66 A legal dispute is defined
63.

ICJ Statute, Art.49(2).

64.

Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (New

Application: 1962) (Second Phase) Judge Jessup, Separate Opinion, [1970] ICJ Rep 161, para.97.
65.

C.f Corfu Channel case, p. 18.

66.

Tomuschat, in Zimmermann, p.596, para.7.
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as a "disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or
interests between two persons ' 67 that is "capable of being settled by the
application of principles and rules of international law. 68 The Parties'
disagreement as to whether the Court can and should declare that the
Secretary-General may lawfully hand over Ravisia's intelligence to
Alicanto constitutes such a legal dispute on which the Court can adjudicate.
b. The Monetary Goldprincipledoes not apply in the present case.
The principle articulated in the Monetary Gold case 69 precludes the
Court from entertaining the merits of a case where "the very subject-matter
of the Court's decision"7 ° would require an incidental assessment of the
conduct of a State who is not party to the proceedings. 7 This principle is
derived from the consensual basis of the Court's jurisdiction 72 but does not
apply as regards the conduct of UN organs, however, as the UN is not a
State.
2. The Court should make the requested declaration on the merits.
a. The Court is under a duty to ensure Alicanto's access to the intelligence.
It follows from the Court's role as the principal judicial organ of the
UN that its primary function is to administer justice properly. 73 This
requires it to afford Alicanto the opportunity to see and give its account of
the intelligence relied upon by Ravisia to justify its intervention.
The Court must therefore exercise its powers insofar as possible to
ensure the proper administration of justice, namely to ensure that Alicanto
has access to the said intelligence. Article 34(2) of the ICJ Statute confers a
power on the Court to "request of public international organizations
information relevant to cases before it."' 74 Accordingly, the Court can
67.
The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v UK) (Jurisdiction) [1924] PCU Series
A No. 2, pp.6&l I.
68.
Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v Honduras) (Jurisdiction and
Admissibility) [1988] ICJ Rep 69, para.52.
69.
Monetary GoldRemoved from Rome in 1943 (Italy v France, United Kingdom and United
States ofAmerica) (Preliminary Question) [ 1954] ICJ Rep 19 [Monetary Gold case], p.32-3.
70.

East Timor (Portugalv Australia) [1995] ICJ Rep 90, para.28.

71.

Supra note 68.

72. Ibid. See also UNGA GAOR (Provisional Version) 51st Session [15 October 1996] UN
Doc A/51 /PV.34, p. 4 ; Tomuschat, in Zimmermann, pp.602 ff., paras. 19 if.
73.
ICJ Statute, Arts.38(1)&65; UN Charter, Arts.92 ff.; Kolb, in Zimmermann, p.806,
para.22; Rosenne, pp.138- 4 0.
74.

Rules of the ICJ, Art.69(4).
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request the Secretary-General, the UN's chief executive, to furnish
information before it in order to equip the Court to ensure its access to all
relevant evidence prior to reaching a decision.75 It would therefore be
contrary to the object and purpose of Article 34(2) to decline to declare that
the Secretary-General may achieve the same purpose by handing over the
same intelligence to Alicanto,76 especially because evidence handed 77over to
the Court directly needs to be communicated to Alicanto either way.
This point is reinforced by the fact that in refusing to hand over the
intelligence, Ravisia has acted contrary to the obligation of good faith under
Article 2(2) of the Charter not to frustrate the proper administration of
justice by the Court by supplying the best evidence available. 78 It is
submitted that Ravisia's argument that the Secretary-General should be
prevented from handing over the documents in question to Alicanto
necessarily contravenes this duty.79
b. This duty does not conflict with the Court's role as a principalorgan
of the UN
Such an exercise of the Court's powers does not conflict with the
Court's role as a principal organ of the UN which demands that it
safeguards the principles and purposes of the UN such as the sovereignty
equality of States. ° While this principle might preclude the Court from
compelling a State party to produce documents or supply information under
Article 49(1) of the ICJ Statute, it does not prevent the Court from declaring
that the Secretary-General may lawfully hand over the Ravisian intelligence
to Alicanto. By voluntarily handing over the intelligence to the SecretaryGeneral directly, Ravisia has conceded its total control over the intelligence
and must bear the consequences of that decision, namely that it is now
subject to the rights and duties governing the Secretary's General office.

75.

Rosenne, p.1080; Sandifer, pp.1-2; Torres Bernirdez, in Zimmermann, p.1096, para.68.

76.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [ 1969] 1155 UNTS 331, Art. 18.

77.

ICJ Statute, Art. 43(4); Rules of the ICJ, Arts.52(1)&56.

78.
UNGA Res 2625, supra note 2; Kolb, in Zimmermann, pp.830-1, para.64; Zoller, 'La
Bonne Foi En DroitInternationalPublic [1 st ed. Pedone, Paris 1977], pp.147&151.
79.

Kolb, in Zimmermann, p. 834, para.7 1; Cheng, supra note 56, p. 12 1.

80.
Legality of Use of Force Case (Yugoslavia v Belgium) (Provisional Measures) [ 1999] ICJ
Rep 124, para. 18; Aerial Incident of27 July 1955 (Israelv Bulgaria)(Preliminary Objections) [1959]
ICJ Rep 127, p.1 4 2; Rosenne, pp.106, 108 & I1; Mosler & Oellers-Frahm, 'Art. 92' in Simma, supra
note 5, pp. 1151-2.
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The Secretary-General's duty of loyalty to the Organisation further
demands that he produces documents requested by the Court pursuant to
Article 34(2) of the ICJ Statute.8'
Thus the only conclusion that can be drawn from the fact that Ravisia
nevertheless proceeded to hand over the intelligence to the SecretaryGeneral is that Ravisia impliedly accepted that the Secretary-General may
hand it over to the Court which is, as shown above,82 no different for
present purposes from him handing it over to Alicanto.
The fact that this Court cannot compel Ravisia to hand over the
intelligence to Alicanto directly has thus no bearing on the SecretaryGeneral's ability to do so because by handing it over to him Ravisia has
impliedly accepted that he may do so.
III. RAVISIA SHOULD BE CALLED UPON To MAKE REPARATION FOR THE
INJURIES RESULTING FROM THE BROADCASTING OF OFFENSIVE RADIO
PROGRAMMING AND THE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF ALICANTAN
CHILDREN, WHICH VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CULTURAL
AND RELIGIOUS INTEGRITY OF ALICANTO.

According to the International Law Commission's ("ILC") ARSIWA
articles, an internationally wrongful act is a breach of international law that
is attributable to the State. 3 In relevant part, these represent rules of
customary law.
A. Ravisia is responsiblefor the sexual exploitation ofAlicantan children
by Ravisian soldiers during UNMORPH.
1. Ravisia's soldiers breached international law.
Article 6 of the Status of Forces Agreement between Alicanto and the
UN ("SOFA") states that the members of UNMORPH "shall respect all
local laws and regulations." 4 Alicantan law prohibits sexual relations
between adults and those under the age of sixteen. The Commission of
Inquiry's findings of substantial occurrences of precisely such relations
therefore amount to a finding of violations of the SOFA and thus
international law.

81.
Rosenne, p. 112; Schwarzenberger, 'InternationalLaw As Applied By InternationalCourts
And Tribunals' [Volume HI - Stevens, London 1976], pp. 3 5 0 -3 .
82.

Memorial H(C)(2)(a).

83.

ARSIWA, Art.2.

84.
UNGA 'Report of the Secretary General: Model Status of Forces Agreement for
Peacekeeping Operations' [1990) UN Doec A/45/594.
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Additionally, Article 2 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,85
requires State parties to safeguard the rights under the Convention of all
children within their jurisdiction. The vicinity of Camp Tara, where the
abuses took place, was under UNMORPH's effective control and thus their
jurisdiction for the purposes of the Convention; 86 Ravisian troops must
therefore uphold the Convention rights of Alicantan children, defined by
Article 1 as being those aged under eighteen. The failure to prevent and
punish "the exploitative use of children in prostitution" constitutes a
violation of Article 34.
The presence of Ravisian soldiers therefore created a coercive
environment in which the girls only consented to sex out of necessity and as
a result of fear, hunger and/or poverty. 87 It is submitted that since such
coercive circumstances negate consent, the sexual acts complained of
amount to rape.88 Ravisia has therefore breached its duty to protect children
from "sexual abuse. 89
Acts of rape committed by Ravisian peacekeepers are also in breach of
their duty under customary law to protect female civilians from rape in
situations of international conflict. 90
2. This breach of international law is attributable to Ravisia.
a. The breach incurs internationalresponsibility.
In the case of Caire (France)v United Mexican States,91 it was held
that the attribution of the ultra vires conduct of State officials to a State was
only excluded when the act had no connection with their official function.
However, such a connection exists in the present case as the status of the
peacekeepers has been abused in the commission of the acts. Furthermore,
Article 91 of Additional Protocol I states that a State shall be responsible
85.

[1989] 1577 UNTS 3 [Child Convention].

86.

Bankovic v Belgium (App. No. 52207/99) [2007] 44 EHRR SE5, para.69.

87.
UN Special Rapporteur of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery in his
Final Report on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like PracticesDuring
Armed Conflict UNCHR [1998] UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13; The Prosecutorv Jean Paul Akayesu
(Judgment), ICTR-96-4-T [1998], para.688.
88.

Elements of Crimes [2002] UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, Art.8(2)(b)(xxii)-1.

89.

Child Convention, Art. 19.

90.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War [1949] 75
UNTS 287, Art.27(2); Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I) [1977] 1125 UNTS 3
[Additional Protocol ], Art.76(l). See also UNSC Resolution 1674 [2006] UN Doc S/RES/1674,
para.20; Secretary-General's Bulletin [ 19 October 2003] UN Doc ST/SGB/2003/13.
91.

[1929] V RIAA 516, p.531.
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for "all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces." Since
these rules represent customary law, Ravisia is directly responsible for the
acts complained of. Ravisia's responsibility is also derived from its failure
to comply with its customary duty to prevent and punish the acts.92
b. The breach does not incur the responsibilityof the UN alone.
It is submitted that all acts complained of were and remain attributable
to Ravisia. Unlike in the case of Behrami v France,93 the Ravisian acts
involved no failure of a UN mission to perform its mandate, but fell outside
of UNMORPH's mandate. Conduct is thus not attributable to the UN on a
basis of "ultimate authority and control," 94 but only where the UN retained
effective control over the specific conduct. This is evidenced in Article 5 of
the Draft Articles of Responsibility of International Organizations.9 5 The
commentary to the Article indicates that the "effective control" test is to
have the same meaning9 6 as it does
in Article 8 ARSIWA as interpreted by
97
the Court in the Nicaraguacase.
The UN did not exercise effective control over the relevant conduct of
Ravisian soldiers as it is not responsible for the discipline of peacekeepers,
especially not in their off-duty conduct.9 8 Article 7 ter of the Draft Model
Memorandum of Understanding9 9 also explicitly vests responsibility for
troop discipline in the commander of the national contingent. Additionally,
the fact that Article 47(b) of the SOFA grants exclusive jurisdiction for
criminal acts of troops to their State of origin is further evidence that the
UN do not exercise effective control over the relevant acts.
In the alternative, even if the acts are attributable to the UN, nothing in
international law precludes dual attribution in the present circumstances. 0 0

92.
Veldsquez-Rodriquez v Honduras (Merits) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series
C No. 4 [1988], para.174.
93.

(App. No. 71412/01) [2007] 45 EHRR SEI0.

94.

Ibid., para.133.

95.

UNGA GAOR Report of the ILC, 61st session [2006] UN Doe A/61/10 [DARIO], p.252.

96.
ILC Commentary on Draft Articles 4-7 of Responsibility of International Organisations
UNGA GAOR Report of the ILC, 59th session [2004] UN Doc A/59/10, p.110.
97.
Nicaragua case, para. 115. See also, Larsen, 'Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations:
the "Ultimate Authority and Control" Test' [2008] 19 EURJIL 509 [Larsen], at pp.515&525. See also R
(Al-Jedda) v Secretary of Statefor Defence [2007] UKHL 58 [Al-Jedda case], para.22.
98.

1986 Memorandum from the UN Office of Legal Affairs [ 1986] UNJY 300.
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100.
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B. Ravisia is responsiblefor the unlawful broadcastingof offensive radio
programmingduring UNMORPH.
1. The broadcasts were a breach of international law.
By failing to comply with the Alicantan legal requirement of approval
prior to the broadcast of such material, Ravisia's soldiers have violated
Article 6 of the SOFA.
Moreover, in the event of any conflict between the SOFA and
Resolution 5440's l authorisation of UNMORPH's broadcasts for the
encouragement of "progressive development," such authorisation is
precluded in the present case by the presence of the SOFA. As the SOFA
determines the operation of the Resolution, it is submitted that the principle
of interpretation of conflicting obligations enshrined in Article 30(3) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties' 0 2 indicates that the Resolution
must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the SOFA. It follows that
the Resolution cannot authorise the broadcasts and thus that Ravisia's
soldiers are not exempted from their breach of the SOFA.
Moreover, Ravisia's soldiers were acting outside of their mandate and
so, in broadcasting the offensive programs, failed to comply
with the duty
10 3
of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another State.
2. This breach of international law is attributable to Ravisia.
The radio station was operated solely by Ravisian soldiers acting under
orders from their superiors. The breach is therefore not attributable to the
soldiers in their private capacity, but to the Ravisian army and by extension
to the Ravisan State.'1 4 As Ravisia has exceeded its powers and violated the
SOFA, the UN cannot have exercised effective control over these actions
and thus the breach of international law is attributable to Ravisia.
3. There are no circumstances precluding wrongfulness.
It is submitted that there are no circumstances precluding the
wrongfulness of this breach of international law. In particular the

101.

Supranote 18.

102.

Supra note 76.

103.

Memorial I(A)(1).

104. ARS1WA, Art.4; See also Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights (Advisory Opinion) [1999] ICJ Rep 62,
para.62.
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requirements for a justified countermeasure as set out by Articles 49 and 52
ARSIWA and representative of customary law' 0 5 have not been met.
Article 49 ARSIWA requires that countermeasures can only be taken
in response to an internationally wrongful act committed by another State.
The teachings of the Talonnic faith are consistent with Alicanto's
obligations under the Child Convention and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women' 0 6 as
interpreted under the declaration transmitted by Alicanto upon ratification
in June 2006.107 Therefore, Alicanto is not in breach of any relevant
international obligations.
In any event, Article 49 only provides for countermeasures where
taken in order to induce the target State to comply with its obligation to
cease its wrongful conduct. Ravisia has failed to do so. This is further
evidenced by Ravisia's failure to call upon Alicanto to fulfil the disputed
obligations prior to taking such measures, contrary to Article 52.
Since the conditions for a justified countermeasure have not been met,
it follows that Ravisia is responsible for the unlawful broadcasting in breach
of international law that are attributable to it.
C. Ravisia is responsiblefor the unlawful broadcastingof offensive radio
programmingduring OPS.
Any unlawful broadcasting occurring in Alicanto subsequent to the
termination of UNMORPH is necessarily attributable to Ravisia. 0 8 As
Ravisia's broadcasting has persisted during OPS, it is in continuing breach
of international law. In any event, since Ravisia cannot derive any rights
from its unlawful occupation, the broadcasting and its inference with
Alicanto's internal matters necessarily violate Article 2 of the Charter.
Moreover, there are no circumstances that preclude the wrongfulness
Ravisia's breach. 10 9

105.
para.83-4.
106.

Gabjikovo-Nagymaros Project case (Hungary v Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7,
[1979] 1249 UNTS 13.

107. Brems, 'Human Rights: 'Universalityor Diversity' [ I st ed. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague
2001], pp.267-8; HRC 'Record of the Consideration of the Report Submitted by Egypt under Article 40
ICCPR' [23 October 2002] UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2048, para. 11.
108.

Memorial I1I(B)(2).

109.

Memorial 1I(B)(3).
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D. Ravisia must make reparationsfor these internationallywrongful acts.
It is well-established in customary law that a State must cease and
make full reparation for any wrongful act that engages its responsibility." i0
In the present case, full reparation requires Ravisia to make restitution for
its failure to punish the perpetrators of the sexual abuse"' and to cease
broadcasting without Alicantan approval." 2 Article 36 ARSIWA requires
compensation for the injury suffered by the victims of the sexual
exploitation and to meet the costs of repairing the damage suffered by
Alicanto as a result of the unlawful broadcasts." 3
IV. RAVISIA SHOULD IMMEDIATELY DELIVER THE FUGITIVE PICCARDO
DONATI So THAT HIS LAWFUL SENTENCE MAY BE CARRIED OUT.

A. Ravisia's FailureTo Return DonatiIs An Internationally Wrongful Act.
1. Ravisia continues to violate Alicanto's sovereignty by preventing
Alicanto from exercising enforcement jurisdiction in its own territory.
a. Alicanto is exclusively entitled to exercise enforcementjurisdictionin its
own territory.
A State's "title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty."" 4 This
right cannot be exercised "if to do so would conflict with the rights of the
state having territorial jurisdiction."" 5 In this sense, enforcement
jurisdiction is exclusive to the territorial state. Since Camp Tara is located
entirely within Alicanto, Alicanto is exclusively entitled to exercise
enforcement jurisdiction over it.
This entitlement cannot be defeated by an assertion of de facto
control 16 by Ravisian troops as Ravisia cannot derive any rights from its

110.

ARSIWA, Art.30-1.

111.

ARSIWA, Art.35.

112. Factory at Chorzdw (Germany v Poland)(Merits) [1928] PCU Rep Series A No. 17, p.48;
See also ARSIWA, Arts.29&30. See also Gray, 'JudicialRemedies in InternationalLaw' [lst ed.
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987] [JudicialRemedies in InternationalLaw], pp.95 If.
113. The Lusitania case (US v Germany) [1923] VII RIAA 32 (Sales No. 1956.V.5), p.40. See
generally JudicialRemedies in InternationalLaw, p.77 ff.
114.

Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Francev Turkey) (Judgment) [1927] PCU Rep Series A No. 10,

p.19 .
115. Oppenheim, 'InternationalLaw' (Jennings & Watts eds.) [9th ed. Longman, London
1992] [Oppenheim], p.458.
116. R (on the applicationofAl-Saadoon) v Secretary of Statefor Defence [2008] EWHC 3098
(Admin), para.66.
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unlawful intervention' 17 and the right to exercise jurisdiction attaches to
8
Alicanto's territorial sovereignty which is inviolable in international law."
b. Ravisia continues to unlawfully interfere with this sovereign right.
By admitting Donati to Camp Tara, Ravisia effectively withdrew him
from the jurisdiction of the territorial State, Alicanto, which constitutes an
intervention in matters which are exclusively within Alicanto's
competence,1 9 namely the execution of a criminal sentence imposed by its
courts. Therefore, Ravisia's continuing refusal to deliver Donati to Alicanto
amounts to a continuing violation of Alicanto's sovereignty.
2. In any event, Ravisia continues to violate international law by
harbouring a terrorist.
a. Ravisia is in breach of its obligations under Resolution 13 73.
By granting Donati refuge in Camp Tara, Ravisia is in continuing
breach of its obligations under Security Council Resolution 1373120
("Resolution 1373") which "decides" that all States shall deny safe haven to
those who commit terrorist acts.
i. Donati has committed a terrorist act.
For the purposes of the Resolution, terrorist acts include those acts
outlawed in various international anti-terrorism conventions. 12 For
instance, Article 2(1) of the International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings1 22 ("Terrorist Bombings Convention") prohibits
detonating explosive devices inter alia in a place of public use or a State or
government facility. By bombing Prime Minister Simurg's car as he entered
the airport grounds, Donati has committed the above offences among
others. 23 Since terrorism is thus defined by conduct and
not by motive, the
24
question of Donati' s political motivation is irrelevant.
117.

Memorial 1Il(C).

118.

Oppenheim, supra note 115, p. 7 0 0 .

119.

Asylum case, supra note 35, p. 2 7 4 .

120.

UNSC, [2001] UN Doc S/RES/1373, para.2(c).

121. Ibid., Preamble. See also 'UN Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change' [2004] UN Dec A/59/565, para.164; UNSC President's Statement of
22 November 1989 UN Doec S/20988; UNSC Res 1189 [1998] UN Doec S/RES/i 189.
122.

[1997] 2149 UNTS 256.

123. See also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents [1973] 1035 UNTS 167, Arts.2(1)(a)&(b); Montreal
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ii. Ravisia is providing safe haven for terrorists.
By admitting Donati to Camp Tara, Ravisia has facilitated his evasion
of criminal responsibility which amounts to providing safe haven to
terrorists contrary to Paragraph 2(c).
Even if Ravisia has not breached its obligations by admitting Donati, it
has done so by granting him refuge in Camp Tara without ensuring that he
is brought to justice by either surrendering him to a country that is willing
to prosecute or by handing him over to its prosecution authorities as
required by Paragraph 2(e). Since Ravisia has not done either, it is
providing safe haven to terrorists contrary to Paragraph 2(c).
b. Ravisia is in breach of its obligations under customary law to surrender
orprosecutefugitive terrorists.
The principle aut dedere, autjudicare(surrender or prosecute) requires
States to surrender or prosecute perpetrators of certain crimes. 125 Alicanto
submits that this obligation has attained customary status as regards
perpetrators of terrorist acts. The requirements of State practice and opinio
juris are met as indicated by the 171 State parties to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, the 166 State parties to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation as amended by the Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation and the
160 State parties to Terrorist Bombings Convention. This points to a
virtually universal acceptance of this obligation, which is also supported by
national and international courts. 126 Ravisia's failure to surrender or
prosecute Donati therefore also breaches its obligations under customary
law.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation [1971] 974 UNTS
177, Art.Ibis as amended by Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports
Serving International Civil Aviation [1988] ICAO Doc 9518, Art.2(l).
124.

Resolution 1373, para.3(g).

125. Bassiouni & Wise, 'Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in
InternationalLaw' [ Ist ed. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1995], p.xii.
126. Goiburay et al. v Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of
Human Rights Series C No. 153 [2006], para. 132; Auto n' 8/2008 correspondienteal Procedimiento de
Extradici6n 1/2007 del Juzgado Centralde Instrucci6n n*2 Seguido a Instancias de las Autoridades de
la Repniblica Argentina contra Dohia Maria Estela Martinez Cartas[2008] Audiencia Nacional Sala De
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B. There Are No CircumstancesPrecludingThe Wrongfulness Of This Act.
Assuming, for present purposes, that conflicting obligations under
human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 127 are essential interests that may be invoked as giving rise
to a situation of necessity precluding the wrongfulness of this breach, 28 it is
submitted that Ravisia cannot rely on such a defence.
1. Ravisia cannot invoke necessity on the grounds of human rights
obligations owed to Piccardo Donati.
If the Court accepts that Alicanto is entitled to exercise territorial
jurisdiction over Donati, Ravisia's human rights obligations may give rise
to a situation of necessity only where it is clear that Alicanto "intends to
subject the fugitive to treatment so harsh as to constitute a crime against
humanity ' 129 or a comparable level of harm. Donati will be subjected to no
such harm.
With regard to its obligations under Resolution 1373, Ravisia cannot
claim necessity to comply with its ICCPR obligations because the former
obligations exclude this possibility.' 30 The Resolution prevails, by virtue of
Article 103 of the Charter, over any other conflicting international
obligations.13 ' Moreover, Ravisia has contributed to this situation of
necessity 32 by intervening in Alicantan territory; but for its unlawful
presence, no potential conflict of obligations would have arisen. Further
still, Ravisia may not invoke necessity because to do so would allow it to
community's essential interest
impair Alicanto and the wider international
33
justice.
to
brought
terrorists
in seeing
2. In any event, those obligations will not be breached.
a. There will be no violation of Donati's right to life.
States not party to the Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR' 34 may, by
virtue of Article 6 ICCPR, issue a death sentence for "the most serious of
127.

(1966] 999 UNTS 171 [ICCPR].

128.

ARSIWA, Art.25.

129. R (B and Others) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2004]
EWCA Civ 1344, para.88.
130.

ARSIWA, Art.25(2Xa).

131.

Al-Jedda case, supra note 97, paras.35&39.

132.

ARSIWA, Art.25(2)(b).

133.

ARSIWA, Art.25(l)(b).

134.

[1989] 1642 UNTS 414.
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crimes". The fact that 95 States currently retain the death penalty in law is
further evidence that the sentence is not in itself prohibited in customary
law. 135 Therefore, Alicanto is permitted under international law to issue a
death sentence for crimes as serious as Donati's.
Ravisia is not prevented from surrendering Donati to Alicanto by its
abolitionist status in relation to the death penalty. While the Human Rights
Committee ("HRC") in the case of Judge v Canada,136 interpreted Article 6
ICCPR as preventing extradition in circumstances in which there is the real
risk that the death penalty will be applied, this interpretation has not
attained the status of customary law; it has not subsequently been reflected
by widespread, consistent or settled State practice. 137 Moreover, such an
interpretation is incorrect as Article 6 merely sets out the limitations on the
use of the death penalty and does not exclude the possibility of extradition
from an abolitionist State to a retentionist
State. The Committee's errant
38
interpretation also exceeded its mandate.1
b. There is no violation of the prohibitionon retroactivepunishment.
Article 15 ICCPR allows for the punishment of offences and
application of penalties prescribed by law. The European Court of Human
Rights ("ECtHR") in SW v UK has interpreted the near-identical Article 7
ECHR 13 9 as requiring a law or penalty to be both foreseeable and accessible
to be non-retroactive. 140 It is submitted that the same principle applies to the
present circumstances. The change in Alicanto's legal system was
foreseeable at the time Donati's offence was committed due to Prime
Minister Simurg's declared intentions, as demonstrated in his New Year's
Message of 28 April 2008. The substance of the change was also accessible
since it was to conform with the Talonnic Canon. Therefore, the death
penalty, as applied to Donati, does not violate Article 15.

135. Amnesty
International,
'Abolitionist
and
Retentionist
Countries'
<http://www.animesty.org/en/death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries> accessed 6 January
2009.
136.

HRC, Communication No. 829/1998 [2003] UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998, para.10.4.

137.

Supra note 22.

138.

Optional Protocol to ICCPR [1966] 999 UNTS 302, Art. 1.

139. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
[1950] 213 UNTS 220.
140. (App. No. 20166/92) [1996] 21 EHRR 363, para.45. See also Sunday Times v UK (A/30)
[1979-80] 2 EHRR 245, para.49.
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c. There is no violation of the right to afair trial.
Although Article 14(3)(d) ICCPR appears to prohibit trials in absentia,
its interpretation was modified by the HRC in Mbenge v Zaire.14 1 This
reflects a customary norm evidenced inter alia by the Committee's
reaffirmation in General Comment 32142 that trials in absentia are
compatible with ICCPR "if the necessary steps are taken to summon
persons in a timely manner and to inform them beforehand about the date
and place of their trial and to request their attendance.' ' 143 The summons
need not even have reached Donati; it suffices that Alicanto took the
necessary steps to bring it to his attention which it has done in its
nationwide manhunt. By failing to surrender himself to the authorities,
Donati has thus waived his right to be present at the trial. Therefore, there
were justified reasons for trial in absentia in the present case, which human
rights NGOs have said was in all other aspects fair.
Article 14(5) ICCPR states that those convicted of a crime have the
right to have their conviction and sentence "reviewed by a higher tribunal".
The HRC has indicated that this provision does not necessarily require a
full retrial. So long as the court can conduct an evaluation of the evidence
presented at first instance, 1" a right to one review will suffice.145 Since
Donati was allowed such an appeal by a higher tribunal there is no violation
of Article 14(5) if no retrial is given.
d. There would be no violation of the right not to be subjected to cruel,
inhuman or degradingtreatment.
Although the ECtHR has held that in certain circumstances,
46
confinement on death row amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment,'
the situation concerning Donati can be distinguished as he will not be
exposed to an extended period of confinement prior to his execution. There

141.

HRC, Communication No. 16/1977 [1983] UN Doc CCPR/C/18/D/16/1977, para.14.1.

142.

HRC, [2007] UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32.

143.

Ibid., para.36.

144. HRC Rolando v Philippines Communication No. 1110/2002 [2004] UN Doc
CCPR/C/82/D/I 110/2002, para.4.5; HRC Juma v Australia Communication No. 984/2001 [2003] UN
Doc CCPR/C/78/D/984/2001, para.7.5; HRC Perera v Australia Communication No. 536/1993 [1995]
UN Doc CCPR/C/53/D/536/1993, para.6.4. See also HRC General Comment 32, para.48.
145. HRC Rouse v Philippines Communication
CCPR/C/84/D/1089/2002, para.7.6.
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would be no violation of Article 7 ICCPR as because his appeal has already
' 47
been heard, Donati will not be exposed to the "death row phenomenon.'
The act of judicial hanging is also consistent with Article 7 ICCPR.
This proposition is supported by State practice. For instance, Bangladesh,
Botswana, China, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Singapore, Somali,
Sudan and Syria all used hanging as an official method of execution as
recently as 2007.148 The death penalty "must be carried out in such a way as
to cause the least possible physical and mental suffering."' 149 Hanging
renders the convicted person unconscious within a matter of seconds. 150 It
therefore does not cause intended, prolonged suffering or unnecessary
pain. 15' The possibility of pain resulting from an accident during the
procedure does not amount to an "objectively intolerable risk of harm"
which would render the execution cruel and unusual. 52 Therefore, the risk
of strangulation in hanging does not violate Article 7 ICCPR.
C. Ravisia Must Cease This Wrongful Act And Return Donati.
Therefore, Ravisia must cease and make reparation for this continuing
wrongful act,' 53 meaning it must return Donati to Alicanto.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

For the foregoing reasons, the Republic of Alicanto respectfully
requests the Honourable Court to adjudge and declare as follows:
1. That the occupation of Alicantan territory by Ravisian armed forces
since 1 August 2008 has been and continues to be a violation of
international law, and order Ravisia to remove its military personnel
from Alicanto at once;
2. That Ravisia need produce the intelligence delivered to the SecretaryGeneral, and if it refuses, deny Ravisia the right to rely on that

147.

Ibid.

148. Capital Punishment UK, 'Overview of the Death Penalty Worldwide in 2007'
<http://www.capitalpunishmentuk.org/overview.html> accessed 6 January 2009.
149.

HRC General Comment 20 [1992] UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/20.

150. Campbell v Wood 18 F.3d 662 (United States Court of Appeal 9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
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CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991, para.16.3. See also Kelly, 'Cheating Justice by Cheating Death' [2003] 20
Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 491, p. 2 3 .
152. Baze, et al v Rees, et al, 553 US, 128 S. Ct. 1520 [2008], p.1 I Opinion of Roberts, C.J. and
p.15 Opinion of Scalia, J. and Thomas, J.
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3.

4.
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intelligence directly or indirectly to support the legality of Operation
Provide Shelter in international law, or in the alternative, declare that
the Secretary General may lawfully hand over the intelligence to
Alicanto;
That the conduct of Ravisian soldiers at Camp Tara, including the
broadcasting of offensive radio programming and the sexual
exploitation of Alicantan children, are violations of international law
and of the sovereignty and cultural and religious integrity of Alicanto,
attributable to Ravisia, and order Respondent to pay reparations to
compensate for the injury to Alicanto's social fabric; and
That Ravisia deliver to Alicanto the fugitive Piccardo Donati so that
his lawful sentence may be carried out.
All of which is Respectfully Submitted

